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Abstract
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) warn of suspicious or malicious network activity and
are a fundamental, yet passive, defense-in-depth layer for modern networks. Prior research
has applied information fusion techniques to correlate the alerts of multiple IDSs and group
those belonging to the same multi-stage attack into attack tracks. Projecting the next likely
step in these tracks potentially enhances an analyst’s situational awareness; however, the
reliance on attack plans, complicated algorithms, or expert knowledge of the respective
network is prohibitive and prone to obsolescence with the continual deployment of new
technology and evolution of hacker tradecraft.
This thesis presents a real-time continually learning system capable of projecting attack
tracks that does not require a priori knowledge about network architecture or rely on static
attack templates. Prediction correctness over time and other metrics are used to assess the
system’s performance. The system demonstrates the successful real-time adaptation of the
model, including enhancements such as the prediction that a never before observed event
is about to occur. The intrusion projection system is framed as part of a larger information
fusion and impact assessment architecture for cyber security.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This work develops a system to perform fusion and projection of network intrusion activity
based on observed events.
1.1 Motivation
New IT models, business requirements, and operational considerations continue to drive the
trend toward highly interconnected and technologically converged networks [16]. Propri-
etary information processing solutions and stovepiped databases are giving way to unified
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems [26], for example, raising the potential impact
of just a single well planned and executed network intrusion, data theft, or denial of service
(DoS). While trained analysts are responsible for day-to-day security and operation of gov-
ernment agency or corporate enterprise networks, the monitoring and intrusion detection
tools they rely on must evolve to provide the higher-level situation awareness needed when
faced with large multifaceted networks and motivated adversaries.
Unaided, a human cannot efficiently comprehend the high volume of raw IDS alerts
from a large network [3, 23], assess impact, and accurately project virtual intrusion trajec-
tories. Multiple internet gateways, wireless devices, and VPN remote connectivity offer the
promise of redundancy and increased productivity, but exponentially increase the number
of possible attack vectors [7, 38]. An attack waged using IP address spoofing, distributed
botnets, and/or automated exploitation tools, capable of targeting multiple layers of the
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protocol stack [50, 37, 13, 35, 6], further complicates the correlation of alerts generated
from sensors at disparate perimeter gateways.
Information fusion, conversely, holds the promise of correlating those alerts belonging
to the same multi-stage attack [44]; automatically assembling pieces of the analyst’s puzzle
and building situation awareness, obfuscated intentionally by the attacker, or indirectly by
the complicated network architecture. It is not the intention of this overall research effort
to remove the analyst from the loop by taking automated defensive actions or reconfiguring
firewalls. Rather, our system sifts through the overwhelming amount of data in the form of
intrusion alerts, recognizes and correlates important events, projects likely future actions
in real-time, assesses the impact of current and projected attacker actions, and presents this
information to the analyst.
The attack projection system presented as the focus of this thesis is predicated on the
sequential definition of alerts comprising attack tracks as correlated by the information fu-
sion engine, and not pre-defined attack plans. The proposed approach shall reveal plausible
futures not necessarily obvious, or not previously considered by the analyst. Finally, the
projection relies on relatively non-computationally-intensive algorithms, facilitating real-
time performance as the system scales to meet the demands of these enterprise networks.
1.2 Recent Cyber Security Incidents
In the last year alone, several high profile cyber intrusion incidents or reports of trou-
bling vulnerabilities have appeared in the mainstream news. According to the Associated
Press, the State Department reports that last summer their worldwide computer network
was breached after an employee in Asia simply opened a malicious email [8]. Described as
an ”elaborate ploy by sophisticated international hackers” the adversary exploited a design
flaw in Microsoft software and managed to exfiltrate data from the government network.
The State Department eventually detected the breach and deliberately severed access to the
2
region while they assessed the situation; however, the security triage action left the de-
partment without Internet access in the tense weeks leading up to missile tests by North
Korea. The chairman of the Homeland Security Committee said, ”hackers are no longer
considered harmless, bored teenagers. These are experienced, sophisticated people who
are trying to exploit our vulnerabilities and gain access to our information” [8]. Last April
in what has been called the first ”Internet War”, Estonian web sites were overwhelmed by a
series of cyber attacks, putting at risk the civilian banking infrastructure and other internet
dependent services [19].
State sponsored information operations have the potential to leverage methods that are
even more sophisticated than are their private sector counterparts. A recent Wall Street
Journal article quoted a United States government official as saying there is significant ev-
idence implicating the Chinese in several attacks against government networks and that
the Chinese are actively attempting to steal classified information [15]. According to the
director of the SANS Institute, ”An aggressive, non-stop campaign by China to penetrate
key government and industry databases in the United States already has succeeded and
the United States urgently needs to monitor all internet traffic to critical government and
private-sector networks to find the enemy within” [40]. Similar accusations have been lev-
eled against Russia and the United States Director of National Intelligence has proposed a
solution to consolidate the number of and monitor traffic through the access points between
government computers and the internet [41]. The balance between privacy concerns and
the government’s desire to monitor these networks will likely be a topic of great debate
in Congress, however the Defense Department reports they are currently detecting about
three million unauthorized probes on their network per day (compared to two million for
the State Department) [41]. How many reconnaissance and intrusion attempts are going
undetected? How many of the intrusion attempts are succeeding?
Although this new type of asymmetric warfare has a virtual battlefield, the conse-
quences can be real. According to a Central Intelligence Agency analyst, hackers hacked
into and literally turned off the power to several cities overseas after demanding extortion
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payments [9]. Researchers previously demonstrated the vulnerability of SCADA (Super-
visory Control and Data Acquisition) systems when an experimental cyber attack against
a power plant control system caused a generator to physically self destruct [34]. SCADA
systems are responsible for the real-time control and monitoring of many critical national
infrastructure assets, including manufacturing plant controls, power generation, power dis-
tribution, gas pipeline operation, water treatment facilities, etc.
While interconnected SCADA systems offer yet another tempting high-value target for
enterprising terrorists or others with chaos and disruption in mind, the cyber security archi-
tecture discussed here offers the promise of automatically processing those overwhelming
events against a large Department of Defense or Department of State network. At a high-
level, the analyst needs to know which events belong to the same attack and which attacks
merit further investigation or countermeasures.
1.3 Information Fusion
The Joint Director’s of Laboratories (JDL) fusion model has been the most influential def-
inition of fusion hierarchy for this cyber security work [47]. The data driven JDL defines
five levels, with level zero (L0) starting at the sensor level where raw data or a signal is
generated. Traditionally, for example, sensors may have been multiple radar systems at-
tempting to track incoming missiles. In the cyber domain, this input is provided by intrusion
detection systems.
Next, L1 fusion attempts to identify and correlate the raw data from L0. In the cyber
realm, L0 refers to raw intrusion events, while L1 processing correlates these raw events
together into larger objects, each representing an ongoing attack. L2 processing then per-
forms situation assessment where the system derives knowledge about the L1 objects using
pre-defined or learned models. Impact assessment and projection, the prediction of plausi-
ble future states, and process refinement are performed at higher fusion levels. Figure 1.1
illustrates the key levels of the classic JDL fusion model.
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Essentially, the system seeks to take a raw signal and derive knowledge. Mirroring
the physical battlefield situation awareness sought by military commanders, the derivation
of knowledge about current activity on a computer network involves both the ability to
identify and recognize given activities and assess their importance [42].
Figure 1.1: 1998 JDL Fusion Model [32]
By encapsulating observed behavior in a model, this work seeks to project the current
state or situation forward to a set of plausible future states. The impact of each of these
plausible futures can then be assessed, contributing to the situation awareness. If the cur-
rent situation seems rather benign but each projected future shows dire impact assessments,
action may conceivably avert an undesirable future. Although the particular implementa-
tion in this thesis has been designed for network intrusion activity, the underlying concepts
are applicable to a number of fields, including intelligence and terrorist threat projection.
1.4 Real-time Projection Approach
This thesis develops a system capable of real-time projection of ongoing attacks includ-
ing the algorithm implementations, graphical user interface, and event-driven simulation
5
environment necessary to run tests and evaluate system performance. The modular nature
of the system permits the testing of new algorithms and ideas as well as direct integra-
tion with other components, working toward the goal of practical field-deployable cyber
security systems.
Chapter 2 explains this projection system in the context of modern computer networks
and an information fusion environment. Chapter 3 defines the architecture and related
design considerations of the real-time projection system, including how intrusion events
are generated and processed. This chapter also develops the mathematical models and
algorithms on which the system relies. Chapter 4 covers the experiments performed, the
experimental data that was used, and provides a detailed analysis of the results. Finally,
Chapter 5 summarizes what was accomplished and offers possible extensions to this work.
6
Chapter 2
Cyber Security Architecture
This chapter discusses the overall cyber security architecture (Figure 2.1) and related work,
giving perspective to the proposed projection system.
Figure 2.1: Overall System Architecture
The system seeks to increase situational awareness by assessing and estimating plau-
sible futures through the capability, opportunity, intent and behavioral domains. The in-
trusion methods available to the attacker juxtaposed with the opportunity and intelligence
gathered about the target and the target’s importance frames the threat’s severity. While an
attacker’s true intent may be difficult to assess, deriving knowledge from the patterns of
intrusion observations is possible and this attacker behavior can itself be exploited for our
7
purposes.
2.1 Intrusion Detection
Tracking and projecting cyber attacks relies on the accurate and timely reporting of suspi-
cious activity. Host and network based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) generate alerts
when they observe suspicious, although not necessarily malicious, activity [43, 18, 17].
Most IDSs are classified as knowledge-based (e.g.pattern inspection, deep packet inspec-
tion) or behavioral-based (e.g.statistical anomaly). Figure 2.2 illustrates the elements of
IDS taxonomy as descibed by Debar et al.[1]. It is not in the scope of this research to
design a better IDS, but to derive understanding from the observables of attacker actions.
Figure 2.2: Intrusion Detection System Characteristics
While the breadth of included information and formatting of an IDS alert varies ac-
cording to system type and implementation, fields indicating the destination IP address,
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description of the alert cause, network protocol, and time are common and naturally impor-
tant. Figure 2.3 shows a sample alert in XML format. The format of other IDS alerts are
similar [43, 18, 17].
Figure 2.3: IDS Alert XML Example
2.2 Alert Correlation
Several methods for alert aggregation [12, 14] and alert correlation [28, 36, 48, 49, 44]
have been proposed to solve the problem of overwhelming alert volume. Alert correlation
essentially finds IDS alerts that are related and organizes them into ordered collections.
These collections can be considered to represent the virtual trajectories of cyber attacks.
The alert fusion engine, Information Fusion Engine for Real-time Decision Making
(INFERD) [44], is a keystone to this overall architecture. Based on sensor data and a
priori models, INFERD dynamically generates, evolves, and evaluates hypothesis on the
current state of the environment, performing information fusion at levels zero, one, and
two to provide real-time situation assessment. At L2, INFERD uses guidance templates to
instantiate acyclic directed graphs used for understanding the current state of the network.
In practice, the follow-on systems, including projection, consider INFERD’s acyclic
directed graphs as ordered sequences of alerts called attack tracks. Each track represents
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an unfolding multi-stage attack sequence. Figure 2.4 shows the additional information ap-
pended to each alert by INFERD. Specifically, note the track ID field that associates an alert
with an INFERD track number. The category field is also assigned by INFERD, indicating
which of several general categories best matches this alert (reconnaissance, intrusion, DoS,
Data Exfiltration, and so on).
Figure 2.4: INFERD Track XML Example
2.3 Impact Assessment
Threat and Impact Assessment (TIA) differentiates those attacks with cause for immediate
concern from benign or lower priority threats. The Virtual Terrain Assisted Impact Assess-
ment for Cyber Attacks (VTAC), developed by B. Argauer, is used in our architecture to
analyze the correlated alerts and determine the impact of progressing attacks to network
services and users [20].
The VTAC impact assessment algorithm uses a graph-based virtual terrain model and
combines impact assessments of damage caused by the attacks. Impact scores are defined
for hosts, services, users, and the subnet or network as a whole. For example, the damage
done to a host with respect to its services, importance, and asserted exposures is defined as
the host impact. These assessments naturally focus attention on those attacks with the most
deleterious impact.
Furthermore, Argauer designed and implemented a representative test network using
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the virtual terrain model. This network was used in conjunction with a cyber attack simu-
lation platform [29] to generate one type of test data sets for this projection work.
2.4 Projection
While the INFERD architecture continues to improve its performance at the L0, L1, and
L2 fusion levels, the projection of cyber attacks could be considered an L3 challenge [47,
24, 32]. Figure 2.5 shows the information fusion layers in context of this work.
Figure 2.5: Cyber Security Fusion Layers
Past work in the area of prediction or projection has relied on manually defining the sig-
nificance of network services and servers, or matching ongoing attacks against pre-defined
attack templates. For example, Qin and Lee proposed one of the first high level attack pro-
jection schemes [39], which investigated the use of a combined alert correlation and attack
prediction system. Their work identified attack sequences by applying Bayesian networks
to IDS alerts. Performing plan recognition at this high level required the creation of attack
plans by domain experts, thus relying on matching of ongoing attacks against static a priori
models. Generally, it is challenging to create attack plans that are broad enough to capture
the possible scope of attacker behavior, while specific enough to provide useful or previ-
ously unconsidered futures. In addition, a more recent approach by Mehta et al.employs
pre-constructed probabilistic attack graphs [33].
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Holsopple et al.used additional a priori information to project plausible futures, relying
on knowledge of the network topology, a mapping between services and host computers,
and observed attack sequences [25]. The resulting threat score from this work, and similarly
from work by Arnes et al.[2], indicated which entities of the network were most likely to
become the next targets of an attack.
The work done by Fava et al.[20] introduces the idea of making predictions based on
the correlated alerts as individual attack tracks and not a priori information, decoupling the
tasks of network modeling and attack behavior modeling. This context-based model derives
from the work originally applied to compression and prediction [5], and from attack graph
prediction by Li et al.[30]. It is pioneering in that the projection is based on an attacker’s
behavior as learned by the system.
This thesis extends Fava’s work by implementing the training and prediction algorithms
simultaneously and in real-time for an arbitrary number of alert field definitions. The sys-
tem is also continually learning, instead of pre-trained, confirming or rejecting previous
projections as new attack steps are observed. By projecting these plausible future actions
from attack patterns (Figure 2.6), the system reveals potential network vulnerabilities that
may be imminently exploited, complimenting the threat scores by Holsopple et al.
Figure 2.6: Projection Example
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Chapter 3
Real-time Projection
This chapter will present both the attack modeling and real-time projection algorithms used
by this system.
3.1 Projection Architecture
The fusion process of extracting behavior patterns starts by transforming ordered collection
of IDS alerts into simple sequences of symbols. Incoming alerts are parsed according to
their track-based XML tags, mapping the values of selected tags to alphabet symbols, and
building the corresponding attack tracks and suffix trees.
The suffix tree model is a fused representation of the observed tracks, integrating at-
tacker behaviors into a single model. Separate suffix trees, symbol mappings, and track
histories are used internally for each uniquely defined IDS alert field. Variable Length
Markov Models (VLMM) are then used to create projections for each track based on their
unique histories and the suffix tree.
Figure 3.1 shows the logical data flow of the projection system, starting with the input
of intrusion events on the left and the output on the right. This thesis uses stored input data
in XML files for simulation purposes instead of a real-time API, which would facilitate
seamless integration with other systems. First, the XML Parser class translates XML files
into ALERT objects, which are then ordered chronologically by the Alert Sequencer and
injected into the rest of the system as commanded by the graphical user interface.
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Figure 3.1: Logical Data Flow of the Projection System
The translation of detailed alert field descriptions into symbols is handled by the Alpha-
bet Generator class which creates and stores symbol definitions. Next, the Suffix Tracker
correlates the new symbols to their track histories and passes these completed sequences,
the new symbol along with its respective predecessor symbols, to the Predictor and Model.
The suffix tree model is trained with the new sequence and the predictor predicts the next
likely symbol from the observed sequence updated with the latest symbol and the state of
the model. This prediction is then stored in the Prediction Tracker and used by the Metrics
classes to determine if the prediction was correct when the next symbols arrive. Moving
averages are stored and written to comma separated value files upon user request for easy
spreadsheet analysis.
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3.2 Alphabet
Our system does not require pre-filtering alerts or pre-defining the list and meaning of
alphabet symbols. Instead, user-defined alert fields are independently mapped to a symbol
in their respective alphabet, Ω, forming a symbol space. Integers are used as symbols, a
computationally efficient approach allowing very large alphabet sizes. The observation of
a new alert field value automatically creates a new symbol with its corresponding meaning
in a hash map.
Attack tracks are built in parallel for each alphabet definition in the symbol space, rep-
resenting the same multi-stage attack from the perspective of attack description, destination
subnet, etc.When an alert arrives, the system looks up the symbol for each alert field and
appends the symbol to the sequence of n alerts s = {x1, x2, ...xn} where xi belongs to
the respective alert field alphabet Ω and is not equal to xi−1. Creating an attack track with
repetitions has the potential to pollute the suffix tree and a projection result equal to the
event that just occurred is of questionable usefulness.
For example, Table 3.1 shows selected fields from the first 12 alerts of a sample data
set for the purpose of examining the resulting alphabet spaces and attack track sequences.
Time Track Dest IP Category Description
12:56:03 49062 100.20.200.15 ExtIntrusionRoot WEB-MISC Invalid HTTP Version String
12:57:09 49332 100.5.111.166 IntIntrusionRoot SHELLCODE x86 NOOP
12:58:11 49262 100.10.20.4 ExtIntrusionOther (http inspect) BARE BYTE UNICODE ENCODING
12:58:45 49265 100.10.20.3 ExtIntrusionRoot NETBIOS SMB IPC$ unicode share access
12:58:59 49261 100.10.20.3 ExtScanning ICMP L3retriever Ping
12:59:37 49066 100.10.20.4 ExtIntrusionRoot WEB-MISC Chunked-Encoding transfer attempt
12:59:37 49066 100.10.20.4 ExtIntrusionOther (http inspect) OVERSIZE CHUNK ENCODING
12:59:38 49066 100.10.20.4 ExtIntrusionOther (http inspect) BARE BYTE UNICODE ENCODING
12:59:48 49294 92.6.85.103 Exfiltration (portscan) TCP Portscan
12:59:50 49067 100.5.111.208 IntScan ICMP PING NMAP
12:59:57 49070 100.10.20.4 ExtIntrusionRoot WEB-MISC cross site scripting attempt
13:00:21 49070 100.10.20.4 ExtIntrusionOther (http inspect) OVERSIZE CHUNK ENCODING
Table 3.1: Example Alert Sequence
Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 show the respective description, destination subnet, and cate-
gory symbol mappings as they are defined after the twelve alerts in Tabletab:AlphabetAlerts
are observed.
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Character Value
1 WEB-MISC Invalid HTTP Version String
2 SHELLCODE x86 NOOP
3 (http inspect) BARE BYTE UNICODE ENCODING
4 NETBIOS SMB IPC$ unicode share access
5 ICMP L3retriever Ping
6 WEB-MISC Chunked-Encoding transfer attempt
7 (http inspect) OVERSIZE CHUNK ENCODING
8 (portscan) TCP Portscan
9 ICMP PING NMAP
10 WEB-MISC cross site scripting attempt
Table 3.2: Description Alphabet after Example Alert Sequence
Character Value
1 100.20.200
2 100.5.111
3 100.10.20
4 92.6.85
Table 3.3: Destination Subnet Alphabet after Example Alert Sequence
Character Value
1 ExtIntrusionRoot
2 IntIntrusionRoot
3 ExtIntrusionOther
4 ExtScanning
5 Exfiltration
6 IntScan
Table 3.4: Category Alphabet after Example Alert Sequence
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The alert field type intrinsically determines the size of the resulting alphabet. For ex-
ample, the INFERD generated category is a mapping of the detailed alert description field
to a general category, and therefore the category alphabet generally has fewer symbols than
the description alphabet.
After the fields of incoming alerts are converted to symbols, they are appended to their
respective tracks. For example, Table 3.5 shows the resulting tracks for description.
Track Length Sequence
49066 3 6, 7, 3
49261 1 5
49067 1 9
49070 2 10, 7
49262 1 3
49294 1 8
49265 1 4
49332 1 2
49062 1 1
Table 3.5: Description Tracks after Example Alert Sequence
Notice that while description track 49066 is of length 3, destination subnet track 49066
in Table 3.6 has only one event since repetitions are removed, reflecting only track transi-
tions.
Track Length Sequence
49066 1 3
49261 1 3
49067 1 2
49070 1 3
49262 1 3
49294 1 4
49265 1 3
49332 1 2
49062 1 1
Table 3.6: Destination Subnet Tracks after Example Alert Sequence
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3.3 Suffix Tree Training
Suffix trees for each alphabet definition in the symbol space are trained in parallel whenever
a new alert arrives, integrating the latest behavior of the attack with the tree for use by
prediction algorithms. Separate trees are kept for each alphabet definition and each tree
encompasses all of the tracks for that respective alphabet.
The suffix tree training algorithm was originally motivated by the work of Begleiter,
El-Yaniv, and Yona [4], and modified by Fava [20] to take a set of finite length sequences
instead of a single long sequence of observations. Fava’s finite length sequences have
defined start and end of sequence characters, however the real-time arrival of alerts requires
a new algorithm, training the suffix tree with partial sequences instead of a finite completed
sequence.
For example, a tree built on a single sequence ‘1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1, 0’, where ‘0’ defines the
end of sequence character, is shown in Figure 3.2. Consider the symbols ‘1’ and ‘2’ as
representing alert descriptions WEB-IIS nsiislog.dll access and WEB-MISC Invalid HTTP
Version String, respectively. Edges are weighted with the number of times the suffix tree
is traversed through that branch. For example, ‘1, 2, 1, 0’ happened only once and ‘1, 2’
happened twice in the sequence.
Now consider the construction of the tree one symbol at a time, where the end of the
track is unknown. The sequence ‘1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1’ will be trained as ‘1’, ‘1, 2’, ‘1, 2, 2’,
‘1, 2, 2, 1’, and so on, as the track grows. First, the modified algorithm must properly
increment edge weights, considering only the last symbol as a new addition, instead of the
entire sequence; otherwise, it would unfairly weight prior suffixes. Second, with no end of
sequence characters, child edge weights do not necessarily sum to the parent edge weight,
effectively creating an unbalanced tree. Figure 3.3 shows this real-time algorithm.
Figure 3.4 shows the real-time constructed version of the sequence in Figure 3.2, but
without the end of sequence character (‘0’). Note that the path ‘ROOT ’ to ‘1’ has an edge
weight of three, while the summation of its children node edge weights is only two. An
end of sequence character would have created another child node with edge weight of one,
18
Figure 3.2: The suffix tree for a finite sequence ‘1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1, 0’.
balancing the tree.
Although this implementation assumes ample memory availability for storing the suf-
fix tree models, the continuously learning nature of this real-time system will eventually
require an upper bound placed on the size of the tree. A static training limit or an automatic
pruning algorithm that deletes sparsely traversed branches may be applicable, striking a
balance between memory usage and completeness of the model.
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learnNewAlert( int[] sequence )
for i from 0 to sequence.length do
currentNode = this.root
for j from i to sequence.length do
if j equals sequence.length-1 then
if currentNode.getChild(sequence[j]) equals null then
SuffixTreeNode.createBranch( currentNode, sequence, j )
else
currentNode = currentNode.getChild(sequence[j])
currentNode.incrementEdgeFrequency()
else
currentNode = currentNode.getChild(sequence[j])
end if
end for
end for
end learnNewAlert
Figure 3.3: Real-time Suffix Tree Training Pseudo Code
Figure 3.4: The suffix tree for a real-time sequence ‘1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1’, arriving one alert at a
time.
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3.4 Variable Length Markov Model Prediction
The nth order finite context Markov model relates a new attack step with the previous n
observations in the attack track:
P n{xt+1|xt−n+1, ..., xt}. (3.1)
The current state of the suffix tree is used by the VLMM algorithm to predict the most
likely future action every time a track is appended by processing a new alert. The nth order
prediction is expressed as
xt+1 = arg max
xi∈Ω
P n{xi|xt−n+1, ..., xt}, (3.2)
where n ≤ t. The probability P n is calculated using the suffix tree child edge weights,
taking into account the previous observations.
The probabilities of each prediction up to nth order are then blended using escape prob-
abilities discussed in further detail by Begleiter et al.[4]. The blended probability is the
weighted sum of P o(x):
P (x) =
m∑
o=−1
wo × P o(x) (3.3)
where m is the longest match for the observed sequence s in the suffix tree. In other words,
the algorithm continues calculating and blending Markov model predictions until the length
grows such that the sequence under consideration cannot be found in the tree. Figure 3.5
shows the pseudo code for calculating a probability for any given symbol with a context
history.
For example, with the sequence ‘1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1’ trained using the real-time algorithm,
Table 3.7 shows the probabilities of each symbol occurring next for the 0th, 1st, and 2nd
order models, given an observed sequence of ‘1, 2’.
Probabilities for a 0th order model (P 0) are the normalized counts of all possible char-
acters in the alphabet, representing the relative probability of one character occurring over
another based on the child edge weights directly from the root node on the suffix tree. A
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P(X) P(X given 2) P(X given 1,2)
X=1 3/6 2/3 1/2
X=2 3/6 1/3 1/2
Table 3.7: Predicted symbol probabilities given observed sequence ‘1, 2’
minus one order model is used such that P−1(x) = 1/|Ω| for all x ∈ Ω, giving equal weight
to each symbol in the alphabet, and is explored in depth by Bell et al.[5].
Fava’s work empirically tested several methods of computing escape probabilities and
was not able to identify any particular method as superior [21]. This work implements
four methods of calculating a context’s escape probability, however, 1/(C + 1) is used as
default, where C is the accumulated edge frequency of the current context’s children.
Finally, the blended probability for each of the symbols in the symbol space are sorted in
descending order. A projection is considered correct if the next event’s symbol matches one
of the predicted symbols above a constant number of predictions or accumulated predic-
tion probability threshold. The accumulated prediction probability threshold alternatively
uses a variable number of symbols such that the summation of their blended probabilities
reaches a defined limit. We consider the top three predictions pertinent and reasonable for
consideration by the analyst.
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predict( string context, character c )
accumulated escape = 1
for i from 1 to context.length do
sub context = context[ i, context.length ]
append context = sub context & c
nom = number of matches for append context in suffix tree
denom = number of matches for sub context in suffix tree
probability = nom / denom
escape prob = compute escape(context)
prediction = prediction + probability × (1 - escape prob )
× accumulated escape
accumulated escape = accumulated escape × escape prob
end for
escape prob = compute escape(context)
nom = number of matches for c in suffix tree
denom = total number of observed characters
probability = nom / denom
prediction = prediction + probability × (1 - escape prob )
× accumulated escape
accumulated escape = accumulated escape × escape prob
probability = 1 / alphabet size
prediction = prediction + probability × accumulated escape
return prediction
Figure 3.5: Prediction Pseudo Code [21]
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3.5 Prediction of New Symbols
Without pre-training, this self-learning system will inevitably observe new symbols, a sym-
bol not previously in the universe of known symbols. It is possible, however, to predict the
occurrence of these new symbols by adding a new symbol symbol definition to the symbol
list and training the suffix tree model with an additional sequence to incorporate the behav-
ior pattern of new symbol appearance. When a new symbol occurs, the suffix tree is trained
as normal, and then trained again with the suffix history concatenated with the special new
symbol definition instead of the actual symbol that just occurred. Note that both sequences
are trained using the real-time training algorithm taking into account only the last symbol
in the sequence.
if isNewSymbol equals true then
predictor.learnNewAlert(concat(sequence original, NEW SYMBOL))
end if
Figure 3.6: New Symbol Suffix Tree Training Pseudo Code
Consider the training sequence ‘1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1’ used previously to explore the real-time
suffix tree training algorithm. The sequence would be trained as ‘1’, ‘1, 2’, ‘1, 2, 2’, ‘1, 2, 2, 1’,
and so on. Consider ‘0’ defined as a special new symbol symbol. When ‘1’ arrives, the sym-
bol ‘1’ has not previously been observed, so the tree will be trained with the sequence ‘1’
and then the sequence ‘0’. When the next alert arrives, ‘2’ is a new symbol so the tree will
be trained with the sequence ‘1, 2 and then the sequence‘1, 0. When ‘2’ arrives again as
the next alert, it is not a new symbol and therefore the tree is trained as expected with the
sequence ‘1, 2, 2’.
The suffix tree resulting from the training sequence ‘1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1’ using the new symbol
algorithm is shown in Figure 3.7. Notice that there is now some probability from the root
and from the left branch that a new symbol (‘0’) could occur.
Once new symbol behavior is integrated into the suffix tree model, the VLMM predictor
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Figure 3.7: The suffix tree for a real-time sequence ‘1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1’, training with
newsymbol algorithm.
is able to predict that a new symbol is about to occur just as it would any other symbol.
For example, with the sequence ‘1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1’ trained using the real-time new symbol
algorithm, Table 3.8 shows the probabilities of each symbol occurring next for the 0th, 1st,
and 2nd order models, given an observed sequence of ‘1, 2’. Since a new symbol has never
been observed following the symbol ’2’, the probabilities for all models beyond the 0th are
zero.
P(X) P(X given 2) P(X given 1,2)
X=0 (new symbol) 2/8 0/3 0/2
X=1 3/8 2/3 1/2
X=2 3/8 1/3 1/2
Table 3.8: Predicted symbol probabilities given observed sequence ‘1, 2’ with new symbol
training algorithm
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3.6 Metrics Collection and Prediction Assessment
The system includes a set of metrics classes that store snapshots of selected statistics
throughout the simulation for recall at any time, queried by simulator time index. The UML
relationship is shown by Figure 3.8. Although very flexible and useful for data analysis,
the memory overhead required to store statistics over time for each symbol, track, position,
and alphabet definition overall will not be conducive for a real-time system. Therefore, by
default, the system tracks only overall metrics for each alphabet, and tracks detailed met-
rics by request of the user via the graphical user interface. For processing large data sets or
collecting detailed metrics, the java -Xmx1G flag is used to allocate sufficient Java Virtual
Machine heap space (1GB).
Figure 3.8: Metrics UML
Figure 3.9 shows the actual metrics collected over time for each alphabet definition.
The weighted moving window averages are calculated according to the equation, where
alpha defines the size of the window:
averaget = averaget−1 ∗ alpha + newV alue ∗ (1− alpha) (3.4)
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Figure 3.9: Per Alphabet Metrics
The determination of correct vs. incorrect prediction is determined by comparing a set
of predictions against the next event. A metric that takes into consideration several events
into the future better suites the plausible future scenario, however the stringent determi-
nation made by the next event metric is directly comparable to prior work in the field and
reduces the number of variables to consider when optimizing this part of the overall system.
The set of predictions chosen is determined by a threshold. Traditionally, the top-3 pre-
dictions per track, ordered according to probability, were considered relevant. This sytem
also implements top-1, accumulated probability, and dynamic entropy threshold methods.
The dynamic entropy algorithm is shown in Figure 3.10. These are discussed further in
Chapter 4.
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entropy average = prediction.getAverageEntropy()
entropy = prediction.getEntropy(iterator.next())
threshold = 1
while iterator.hasNext() do
entropy next = prediction.getEntropy(iterator.next())
if entropy greather than or equal to entropy average then
if entropy next less than entropy average then
break
end if
end if
threshold = threshold + 1
end do
Figure 3.10: Dynamic Threshold Pseudo Code
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3.7 Graphical User Interface
All threshold and other options are configured via the graphical user interface. The GUI,
as shown in Figure 3.11, displays a real-time visualization of the suffix tree, track histo-
ries, and symbols for each alphabet definition along with selected metrics such as overall
accuracy and total number of predictions made.
The software performs event-simulation after loading XML files with the alert data
as selected by the user under the File menu. The XML parser supports several markup
formats and offers options to parse only the ground truth instead of the entire file. Upon
selecting a directory, all subdirectories are recursively navigated and files with XML ex-
tensions parsed, enabling easy construction of more complex data sets, while maintaining
file system organization and ability to easily parse a small subset for testing.
Alerts are injected into the real-time portion of the projection system by clicking the
Inject Next Alert or Inject All Remaining Alerts buttons. The real-time content of the Met-
rics Summary, Alphabet, Attack Tracks, and Suffix Tree sub windows reflects the alphabet
definition selected by the View menu.
Advanced options can be configured via the Settings menu as shown by Figure 3.12.
For example, to guarantee mutual exclusivity across data sets, the parser may be config-
ured to prefix track ID numbers with the file path name, or ignore alert time stamps and
generate internal time indices based on the parse order. The re-predict non-updated tracks
and predict new symbols options will be discussed further when analyzing results. Finally,
comma-delimited metrics output via the Metrics menue enables easy importation into a
spreadsheet for further analysis.
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Figure 3.11: Alert Processing and Projection System GUI - Overview
Figure 3.12: Alert Processing and Projection System GUI - Advanced Settings
30
Chapter 4
Results and Discussion
4.1 Experiment Design
In prior work, an experimental dataset of intrusion alerts was randomly split into two
halves. One-half of the tracks were used to pre-train an attack behavior model, and the
other half to test an algorithm’s predictions based on that static model.
In this work, the real-time implementation processes all alerts in chronological order,
one alert at a time. The system generates symbols, dynamically trains models for each
alphabet definition in parallel, and generates next-step prediction sets for each attack track
based on those changing models as events unfold. The relative computational simplicity
of the suffix model and VLMM predictor is important to achieve real-time performance at
high alert volumes. This approach facilitates investigation into the adaptive qualities of the
system to new attack scenarios and more closely resembles a system that may be deployed,
or in this case integrated into a larger projection framework.
In terms of choosing the data for testing, other research in cyber security intrusion
detection has relied on datasets such as those from MIT Lincoln Lab [27] [31], KDD Cup
99 [11], and Defcon [10]. Although in a real-life system the collected alerts could be
correlated by the fusion system, these datasets do not include a ground truth that specifies
which malicious activities are executed as part of the same multi-stage attack, affecting
confidence in the projection results if used for testing.
Instead, this work utilizes several new experimental datasets crafted in a virtualized
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or simulated environment taking into account the need for ground truth. No pre-filtering
of alerts was performed. Alerts are naturally filtered per alert field definition as they are
converted to symbols and only added to tracks if the symbol is not a repetition.
4.1.1 SKAION Virtual Environment
Attack projection experiments have been conducted using a dataset generated by scripted
multi-stage attacks performed on a virtualized network, modeled after a real-life enterprise
architecture. The virtual network contains seven internal subnets (each having a number of
user address spaces), 22 external servers, and 24 internal servers. Example servers include
IIS Web servers, MS Exchange Servers, FTP and VPN servers, running on Linux and
various Windows OS’s.
The SKAION2 data set consists of five sets of attack scenarios, producing a total of
19,908 alerts and 2,559 attack tracks. The attack scenarios range from CGI Overflow, Data
Exfiltration, Phishing, to Denial-of-Service, and differ in the attack targets. Alert mes-
sages were produced by Snort, Dragon, Apache, and IIS. A real-world operational system
should have a data alignment pre-processing component that homogenizes alert messages
produced by different types of IDSs [45, 49]. A homogenization step was not performed
on the dataset used for this research. Instead, only Snort alerts were used, reducing the
dataset to a total of 1482 attack tracks comprising 10425 alerts. Otherwise, differences in
attack descriptions between the Snort and Dragon formats, for example, even if actually
equivalent, will be treated as unique symbols. Correlated alerts are sent to the system in
the order of their time stamps, simulating the arrival of real-time intrusion events.
Table 4.1 shows the first several out of 54 alerts from an example track in the SKAION2
dataset. The first two IP address octets have been purposefully removed, but the table gives
a good example of a track and the data associated with each field.
Table 4.2 shows part of another attack track in this dataset, contrasting the observed
attack description with the predicted description at each step. Each step of this particular
example is an intrusion attempt or goal step taken against a particular machine.
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Alert Num. Time Dest IP Protocol Category Description
1498 12:57:47 xxx.173.106 TCP Intrusion Other (http inspect) BARE BYTE UNICODE ENCODING
1542 12:59:50 xxx.20.3 TCP Intrusion Root NETBIOS SMB IPC$ unicode share access
1588 13:01:38 xxx.20.3 TCP Intrusion Root NETBIOS SMB-DS IPC$ unicode share access
1680 13:05:42 xxx.20.4 TCP Intrusion Root WEB-MISC Invalid HTTP Version String
1712 13:06:39 xxx.20.3 ICMP Recon Scanning ICMP L3retriever Ping
Table 4.1: Example of an Attack Track
The intrusion projection system predicts an attack goal step with description WEB-
MISC apache directory disclosure attempt in the fourth step. Although this prediction is
incorrect according to the strict quantitative assessment of our system, this predicted goal
step did occur shortly thereafter as observed in step six, affirming our plausible futures
assertion. Note that steps four and six are both preceded by WEB-MISC Invalid HTTP
Version String, yet the predictions for each are different, showing that the VLMM indeed
considers the unique histories beyond the immediately previous step.
Time Category Description (Observed) Description (Predicted)
22:35 Intrusion Root WEB-MISC Invalid HTTP Version String WEB-MISC Invalid HTTP Version String
22:35 Goal Dos WEB-MISC apache directory disclosure attempt WEB-MISC apache directory disclosure attempt
23:39 Intrusion Root WEB-MISC Invalid HTTP Version String WEB-MISC Invalid HTTP Version String
23:59 Intrusion Other (http inspect) BARE BYTE UNICODE ENC... WEB-MISC apache directory disclosure attempt
24:42 Intrusion Root WEB-MISC Invalid HTTP Version String WEB-MISC Invalid HTTP Version String
24:42 Goal Dos WEB-MISC apache directory disclosure attempt (http inspect) BARE BYTE UNICODE ENC...
25:01 Intrusion Root WEB-MISC Invalid HTTP Version String WEB-MISC Invalid HTTP Version String
26:29 Intrusion Other (http inspect) BARE BYTE UNICODE ENC... (http inspect) BARE BYTE UNICODE ENC...
Table 4.2: Example Description Observations and Predictions
The SKAION3 data set provides an additional eight scenarios on a similar network.
4.1.2 Simulated Network
Creation of alert sets by simulator is an alternative method to the VMWARE based SKAION
scenarios, allowing quicker turn-around time and in-house collaboration with RIT’s Indus-
trial and Systems Engineering department who implemented the approach. The discrete-
event simulation model was developed to generate representative intrusion detection system
alert data for testing cyber situational awareness tools [29]. The tool allows easy implemen-
tation of network architectures and attack scenarios, including specification of attack stealth
and efficiency. Since the simulation is done at a higher level where machines are modeled
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as entities with properties instead of actual VMWARE hosts with running operating sys-
tems, a relatively very large set of attacks can be waged with fewer computing resources to
run the simulation.
Kuhl et al.[29] modeled cyber attacks in the simulator as stages, corresponding to a
hacker’s capabilities, the progress of the attack, and network architecture. For example, an
attacker must find and compromise an external machine visible from the Internet before
gaining access to the internal network and proceeding toward a goal (Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: Cyber Attack Progression [29]
Table 4.3 defines the typical action at each stage. These attack stages mirror the attack
template used in INFERD for attack correlation.
Stage Typical Action
0 Reconnaissance - Footprinting
1 Intrusion - User
2 Escalation - Service
3 Intrusion - Root
4 Goal (example: Denial of Service)
5 Reconnaissance - Enumeration
6 Intrusion - User
7 Escalation - Service
8 Intrusion - Root
9 Goal (example: Data Exfiltration)
Table 4.3: Attack Stage Example
This projection system was tested with 10 sets of data from this simulated environment,
each with 100 ground truth attack tracks performed on the VTAC virtual terrain test network
34
(Figure 4.2), varying stealth and efficiency parameters to test projection accuracy. The
higher the stealth value, the fewer the number of intermediate goal steps generated by the
simulator. Similarly, higher efficiency values correlate to fewer overall number of steps
generated. A highly skilled attacker would likely take a more direct route to the target,
choose correct exploits, and have a smaller footprint or number actions that are actually
detected by intrusion detection systems.
Figure 4.2: Virtual Terrain [20]
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4.2 Experiment - SKAION2 Prediction Accuracy
Table 4.4 shows the projection accuracy averaged over the entire dataset with attack de-
scription, attack category, network protocol, and destination subnet used to define the
symbol space. The projection accuracy is the percentage of symbols occurring next that
fall within a projection set, comprised of symbols with the highest probabilities according
to the blended VLMM model. Therefore, the Top-3 row considers a projection correct if
the observed event was one of the top three predictions with the highest probability. The
choice of ‘three’ is arbitrary and can be changed to any reasonable number to reflect the
number of plausible futures an analyst can evaluate.
Numbers shown in the Ideal row represent the best real-time theoretical prediction ac-
curacy possible for each alphabet, given the universe of known symbols at the time of each
prediction. In other words, the incorrect predictions for this ideal case are due to a new
symbol appearing as the next event, and therefore could not be predicted using this real-
time algorithm with no a priori information or training sets. The numbers shown in the
Ideal row serve to contrast the performance achieved by the proposed system when using
different symbol space definitions. The Predictions row in Table 4.4 gives the total number
of predictions that the system made for each alphabet definition. Since only transitions are
reflected in attack tracks, and not repetitions, these numbers are less than their potential
given the more than ten thousand original alerts.
DESC. PROTOCOL DEST. CATEGORY
Top-3 75.4% 100% 71.1% 94.6%
Ideal 95.0% 100% 92.6% 99.2%
Predictions 1596 321 121 1319
Symbols 51 4 33 9
Table 4.4: SKAION2: Overall Projection Accuracy Statistics
Note the exceptional accuracy achieved with the uses of category (94.6% with respect
to the ideal 99.2%) and protocol (rounded to 100%) symbol definitions. The accuracy
achieved with the network protocol definition is expected as the symbol space is small
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- only four in the experiment dataset. The nearly perfect projection using the category
definition is promising, especially since it gives the analyst a reasonable scope of projection
without worrying about the specific vulnerability the attacker will attempt to exploit.
The accuracies achieved with the uses of description and destination, though lower than
the other definitions, are also encouraging given the relatively large number of symbols in
the corresponding symbol spaces. Consider the case of description, a blind guess of three
out of 51 will give a prediction rate of 3/51 ≈ 6%, which is much smaller than 75.4%, not
to mention that the ideal real-time case can only achieve 95.0%.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the moving average prediction accuracies achieved by the
system with respect to the total number of injected alerts. This set of results reveals how
the real-time system performs as the model is trained with more and more alert data and
how it fluctuates in the steady state. First, observe the initial transient periods where the
system has not yet observed enough alerts to build an accurate model. After approximately
2000 alerts, most symbols in each symbol space have occurred in the dataset and prediction
accuracies rise toward the values shown in Table 4.4.
The removal of repetitions and time correlation of the prediction accuracy charts across
the alphabet definitions leads to what appears to be a longer transient region for protocol
and destination subnet compared to description and destination. The moving window aver-
age starts with an assumption of zero percent accuracy, while the 100% protocol accuracy
in Table 4.4 is a rounded result of taking the overall number of correct predictions divided
by total number of predictions for that alphabet definition.
As expected, Figure 4.3 shows better accuracy for the generic category alphabet defini-
tion than its more specific description counterpart. Similarly, Figure 4.4 shows near perfect
protocol prediction after the transient period. The destination subnet prediction accuracy
is also noteworthy, showing that the next targeted subnet is relatively harder to predict.
This result reiterates the lower ideal predication rate result for destination subnet shown in
Table 4.4, meaning that the overall attacker behavior exhibits a proclivity for targeting or
progressing toward new subnets.
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Figure 4.3: SKAION2: Description and Category Accuracy
Figure 4.5 shows the percentage of the total number of symbols known to the projection
software as the alerts are injected. The number of symbols generally levels off during the
middle several scenarios, but the last scenario contributes new symbols to the destination
subnet and description alphabets.
It is likely, however, that the less impressive prediction rates shown for destination
subnet in Figure 4.4 would continue to rise with additional training data, and thus the
results shown for this definition may still represent an early transient period. Note the dips
in destination subnet accuracy shown in Figure 4.4 whenever a new symbol appears in
Figure 4.5. New symbols continue to appear late in the training set.
Figure 4.6 shows the accumulated blended VLMM probabilities for the top three pre-
dictions using the destination subnet definition, contrasting this accumulated probability
for the correctly versus incorrectly made predictions. The higher accumulative top-3 prob-
ability for correct predictions suggests that incorrect predictions occur when the plausible
futures do not center on a relatively few number of symbols. This is especially true when
using the destination subnet symbol space, as shown in Figure 4.6.
Contrast Figure 4.6 to Figure 4.7. Figure 4.7 shows the accumulated blended VLMM
probabilities using the description definition. The correct and incorrect predictions are
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Figure 4.4: SKAION2: Protocol and Category Accuracy
much closer and the correct prediction accumulated probability reaches a fairly high steady
state after the initial training period. A relatively few top three symbols are able to achieve
higher accuracy rates and have higher accumulated weights in this metric.
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Figure 4.5: SKAION2: Percentage of Symbols Observed
Figure 4.6: SKAION2: Accumulated Top-3 Probability for Destination
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Figure 4.7: SKAION2: Accumulated Top-3 Probability for Description
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4.3 Experiment - SKAION3 Prediction Accuracy
Table 4.5 shows the projection accuracy averaged over the entire SKAION3 data set with
the same symbol space as the first experiment (attack description, attack category, network
protocol, and destination subnet).
DESC. PROTOCOL DEST. CATEGORY
Top-3 72.2% 98.8% 55.1% 87.1%
Ideal 90.0% 98.8% 88.3% 99.1%
Predictions 2145 171 403 1325
Symbols 81 4 65 13
Table 4.5: SKAION3: Overall Projection Accuracy Statistics
Note that while the SKAION3 data set contained fewer alerts than SKAION2 (4944 vs.
10425), more description predictions were actually made (2145 vs. 1596) when processing
SKAION3, indicating fewer repetitious alerts in the SKAION3 data set. Overall accuracy
rates are similar, although the Top-3 and Ideal fell slightly.
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show the moving average prediction accuracies achieved by the sys-
tem with respect to the total number of injected alerts. A slightly smaller moving average
window (alpha of 0.94 instead of 0.97) was used to generate these figures, showing better
granularity for this data set where there is a higher density of predictions to alerts.
The protocol accuracy in Figure 4.9, however, is shown as the overall, instead of mov-
ing, average in order to more accurately depict the fast rising early transient. In either case,
the overall accuracy of the protocol alert field definition rises very near 100% and is not
deleteriously impacted by the start of any of the following, which do not add new symbols
to the protocol symbol space.
Figure 4.10 shows the percentage of the total number of symbols known to the pro-
jection software as the alerts are injected. With the exception of protocol, each scenario
continues to contribute new symbols to the attack description, attack category, and desti-
nation subnet spaces.
Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.11 show the accumulated blended VLMM probabilities for
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Figure 4.8: SKAION3: Description and Category Accuracy
the top three predictions using the destination subnet and description definitions, respect-
fully, contrasting this accumulated probability for the correctly versus incorrectly made
predictions. During the first several hundred alerts in Figure 4.11 when incorrect predic-
tion probability exceeds correct prediction probability by a relatively substantial margin,
there is a correspondingly dismal prediction accuracy.
Table 4.6 shows the overall averages for the real-time probability weights discussed in
the previous figures. As expected, incorrect predictions have higher average entropies and
lower average probability weights than correct predictions. Tracking these metrics may be
useful as confidence measures for external combination algorithms.
DESC. PROTOCOL DEST. CATEGORY
Entropy - Correct 1.39 0.44 2.05 1.45
Entropy - Incorrect 2.00 1.20 2.30 1.60
Weight - Correct .88 1.00 .78 .92
Weight - Incorrect .74 .79 .69 .88
Table 4.6: SKAION3: Overall Projection Accuracy Statistics
Figure 4.13 shows the real-time entropy results for the description definition, mirroring
the real-time accumulated probability results discussed previously.
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Figure 4.9: SKAION3: Protocol and Category Accuracy
Figure 4.10: SKAION3: Percentage of Symbols Observed
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Figure 4.11: SKAION3: Accumulated Top-3 Probability for Destination
Figure 4.12: SKAION3: Accumulated Top-3 Probability for Description
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Figure 4.13: SKAION3: Description Entropy
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4.4 Experiment - Simulated Prediction Accuracy
The description prediction results for the simulated data set are shown in Table 4.7 and
Table 4.8 per scenario (2A, 2B, etc.). The data shows that stealthy attacks are slightly more
difficult to predict (43.3% vs. 46.8% accuracy for 0.8 vs. 0.4 stealth ratings). Highly
efficent attacks, on the other hand, are shown to be easier to predict (43.3% vs. 37.1% for
1.0 vs. 0.2 efficiency ratings). A non-efficient attack may distort an attacker’s true behavior
by taking unnecessary diversions or engaging in failed exploit attempts before proceeding
to a true goal.
Overall, accuracy rates for this simulated data set are lower than those achieved with
SKAION2 and SKAION3. The nature of the dataset, including simulation environment,
secure network model, and large pool of available theoretical attacks that are continually
introduced as new description symbols is reflected by a low Ideal accuracy rate.
2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 2G 2H 2I 2J
Efficiency 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2
Stealth 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Top-3 43.3% 42.0% 39.7% 36.3% 37.1% 46.8% 43.0% 40.9% 40.7% 36.5%
Ideal 69.6% 70.3% 67.3% 66.5% 77.0% 69.9% 75.1% 68.5% 75.5% 80.5%
Entropy - Cor. 1.86 1.94 2.12 2.17 2.26 2.20 2.17 2.20 2.17 2.20
Entropy - Inc. 2.25 2.32 2.22 2.24 2.33 2.10 2.21 2.19 2.22 2.25
Alerts 13834 14901 14957 13940 20202 13507 14347 14605 15842 20496
Tracks 13210 14187 14115 13032 18551 12968 13713 13849 14841 18938
Symbols 662 677 643 620 772 634 651 671 688 769
Table 4.7: SIMULATED Scenario Matrix: Ground Truth with Noise (Description)
Table 4.7 includes background noise generated by the simulator. The noise consists of
alerts correlated to short tracks, most length 1 (13,333 alerts added as noise, for example, to
scenario 2A). Despite drastically expanding the number of symbols and increasing average
entropies, the change in prediction accuracy is minimal. Although running this experiment
with noise was motivated by a curiosity to understand the impact of noise to the VLMM, in
the context of this cyber security architecture the information fusion engine responsible for
correlation of alerts will inherently filter such noise. If the fusion system fails to properly
correlate several alerts that represent the same action, such as those from Snort vs. Dragon,
47
for example, the non-correlated alert may show up similarly as noise on a short track.
2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 2G 2H 2I 2J
Efficiency 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2
Stealth 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Top-3 42.9% 43.8% 38.5% 37.9% 37.3% 46.6% 43.3% 42.1% 41.8% 37.3%
Ideal 65.7% 63.5% 64.5% 67.1% 78.8% 68.2% 72.8% 65.0% 74.9% 80.5%
Entropy - Cor. 1.55 1.76 1.91 2.00 2.19 2.04 2.05 2.11 2.11 2.17
Entropy - Inc. 1.79 1.88 2.01 2.03 2.25 1.89 2.06 2.06 2.13 2.70
Alerts 501 564 674 759 1436 463 520 647 864 1374
Tracks 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Symbols 62 72 76 85 92 55 57 77 68 87
Table 4.8: SIMULATED Scenario Matrix: Ground Truth (Description)
In addition to processing the scenarios independently, experiments were also performed
processing the scenarios sequentially, maintaining the suffix tree training and system learn-
ing across the scenarios. These results are shown in Table 4.9. The Top-3 description
accuracy did not improve, however the Ideal description rate improved. This improvement
is likely due to the early introduction by the first several scenarios of most of the symbols in
these categories. When ran independently, the system would have to re-learn these during
each scenario. Any behavioral learned by the system in these early scenarios also appears
to translate well to the other scenarios, vs. pre-disposing the system to a behavior that
would lead to a preponderance of incorrect predictions for a subsequent scenario.
DESC. PROTOCOL DEST. CATEGORY
Top-3 40.4% 91.9% 78.5% 62.4%
Ideal 85.1% 92.1% 94.4% 93.1%
Predictions 5280 521 2115 5031
Symbols 268 4 8 11
Table 4.9: SIMULATED: Overall Projection Accuracy Statistics
Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15 show the moving average prediction accuracies achieved
by the system with respect to the total number of injected alerts. Figure 4.14 appears to be
representative of the type of curve one has come to expect when running experiments with
this system, however Figure 4.15 shows a precipitous drop in destination subnet prediction
accuracy during toward the last scenarios.
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Figure 4.14: SIMULATED: Description and Category Accuracy
The improvement in Ideal description rate can objectively be linked to system training
and retention of symbols from prior scenarios, whose symbol spaces do overlap as evi-
denced by 268 unique symbols in this sequential experiment vs. 731 symbols by adding
the symbols row in Table 4.8. One also observes in Figure 4.16 that the protocol, category,
and destination subnet alphabets are completely defined after the first two scenarios, while
each subsequent scenario introduces unique symbols in the description alphabet.
Figures 4.17, 4.18, and 4.19 are provided for comparison with the SKAION2 and
SKAION3 experiments. The correct and incorrect prediction probabilities as well as en-
tropy trend very similarly, making it difficult to distinguish between a correct vs. incorrect
prediction.
The continual introduction of new description symbols shown by Figure 4.16 is a con-
tributing factor to the lower accuracy rates observed in this experiment. The introduction of
new symbols, sometimes correlated with a new scenario, in the SKAION experiments usu-
ally let to a corresponding, yet brief, drop in prediction accuracy as the system adapted to
the new behavior. In this simulated case, the number of description symbols never plateaus.
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Figure 4.15: SIMULATED: Protocol and Category Accuracy
Figure 4.16: SIMULATED: Percentage of Symbols Observed
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Figure 4.17: SIMULATED: Accumulated Top-3 Probability for Destination
Figure 4.18: SIMULATED: Accumulated Top-3 Probability for Description
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Figure 4.19: SIMULATED: Description Entropy
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4.5 Experiment - Threshold Methods
The selection of a reasonably limited number of alerts to present to the analyst and the
impact on prediction accuracy when only this number of alerts is considered warrants ad-
ditional consideration beyond the previously covered Top-3 static threshold. Experiments
were conducted with the SKAION2 data set using a variety of techniques, including thresh-
olds based on accumulated probabilities, and a dynamic threshold based on the entropy
curve and point of diminishing returns.
Figure 4.20 compares the next-event accuracy of these threshold methods. The bar
T40% represents an accumulated prediction probability threshold of 40%, and T100% the
ideal case.
Figure 4.20: Comparison of Prediction Accuracy per Threshold Method
The overall accuracy rates in Figure 4.20 need to be contrasted against the number of
symbols included in each particular threshold method. Figure 4.21 shows these moving
averages for the T40%, T60%, and T80% cases. Notice that T40% includes approximately
one symbol and is therefore very close to the top-1 accuracy. This tends to corroborate the
observation that the VLMM probability distribution across all symbols tends to be weighted
toward a relative few. In this case, the top symbol usually has a weight of 40% or more.
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Figure 4.21: Real-time Number of Symbols Included by Threshold: T40%, T60%, T80%
The shapes of the curves shed further light on the distribution of probability. A spike
in the number of symbols included to meet the threshold occurs shortly after alert num-
ber 2000 and after alert number 9000, but only with the T60%, T80%, T90%, and T95%
methods.
Figure 4.22 shows the dyanmic entropy threshold method. Its curve is noticeably dif-
ferent from that of the constant probability method, generally including more symbols.
The dynamic entropy method, however, is bounded well beneath the total number sym-
bols available from which to choose (Figure 4.23).
Based on these results, the top-3 does appear to be a decent trade-off between number
of symbols included and overall accuracy rates. However, the fusing of predictions made
by this system with others in the architecture will necessitate passing the complete set of
predictions (all symbols and their probabilities) onward, meaning any thresholding may
occur at a higher level.
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Figure 4.22: Real-time Number of Symbols Included by Threshold: T90%, T95%, Dy-
namic
Figure 4.23: Real-time Number of Symbols Included by Threshold Compared to Total
Number of Symbols
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4.6 Experiment - Prediction of New Symbols
The real-time implementation also attempts to predict that a never-before-seen attack is
about to happen. The system does not predict exactly what new attack will happen; instead,
it predicts that a new symbol will occur. In addition to the regular symbols representing
specific attack methods or attack categories, each alphabet subspace contains a special
symbol to track the instances when a new attack happens for the first time. When these
instances occur, the suffix tree will update the branches leading to this symbol. Although
there are few such instances, incorporating this symbol in VLMM allows for potential
warning of a new attack. In this experiment, the system is able to predict 8 out of 51
occurrences of new attack methods (description) for the SKAION2 set and 164 out of 268
occurrences for the Simulated set.
While the percentage results as shown by Table 4.10 is not as impressive as the pre-
diction accuracy presented earlier, these results show promise that the system is able to not
only adaptively train and predict attacks that have been observed, but also provide warnings
of new attacks.
SKAION2 SKAION3 SIMULATED
DESCRIPTION 15.7% 33.3% 61.2%
PROTOCOL 0.0% 0.0% 75.0%
DESTINATION SUBNET 0.0% 10.8% 50.0%
CATEGORY 0.0% 0.0% 36.4%
Table 4.10: Percentage of NEW SYMBOLS Predicted Correctly with Track Re-prediction
Table 4.11 shows the difference in prediction accuracy between the baseline results
presented earlier and the modified algorithm used to predict new symbols. A high new
symbol false positive prediction rate would lead to a corresponding degradation in overall
accuracy rates. Most accuracy rates improved slightly, however, particularly those where
some number of new symbols were correctly predicted. The slight improvements in those
cases where no new symbols were predicted are attributable to the non-updated track re-
prediction algorithm discussed below.
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SKAION2 SKAION3 SIMULATED
DESCRIPTION 1.2% 3.2% 3.7%
PROTOCOL 0.0% 0.6% 7.1%
DESTINATION SUBNET -0.8% 1.7% 10.9%
CATEGORY 0.4% 0.7% 1.9%
Table 4.11: Change in Overall Top-3 Accuracy with NEW SYMBOL Prediction and Track
Re-prediction Algorithms
Figure 4.24 shows the description row in Table 4.11 over time for each experiment set.
For example, a value of 0.1 indicates that a moving average accuracy plot originally at .7
(70%) would have shifted upward to 0.8 (80%). Most experiments benefit from a jump in
prediction accuracy at the beginning of the simulation, when by default most symbols are
new. At points prediction accuracies are negatively impacted by the algorithm, but these
moments tend to be brief, maintaining positive overall accuracy improvements.
Figure 4.24: Change in Top-3 Accuracy for Description with NEW SYMBOL Prediction
and Track Re-prediction Algorithms
Figures 4.25 and 4.26 show the percentage of new symbols predicted vs. the over-
all percentage of symbols observed, showing when the new symbol predictions are made.
The SKAION2 data shows that new symbol predictions are made when new symbols are
actually introduced, and not during any periods where the number of symbols plataues.
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Figure 4.25: SKAION2: Percentage of Symbols with NEW SYMBOL Prediction and
Track Re-prediction Algorithms
During the time between when a set of predictions is made for a track and when that
track’s next event arrives, the global suffix tree model and other tracks continue to be up-
dated as new alerts are observed. By default, a set of predictions for a track is generated
only when there is an update to that particular track. This leads to a discrepancy in the
definition of what constitutes a new symbool. The results in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 were
generated using a re-prediction algorithm that creates predictions for all tracks when any
alert is observed. Therefore, if a new symbol is observed, the prediction sets of all tracks
are updated to reflect this new possibility.
If re-prediction is not done, a new symbol prediction may be made and indeed occur
from the perspective of the track’s set of predictions, while paradoxically that symbol al-
ready appeared elsewhere. Therefore, using this method, it is possible to have a greater
number of correct new symbol predictions than total number of symbols. Tables 4.12 and
4.13 show the results using this non re-prediction approach.
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Figure 4.26: SIMULATED: Percentage of Symbols with NEW SYMBOL Prediction and
Track Re-prediction Algorithms
SKAION2 SKAION3 SIMULATED
DESCRIPTION 35.3% 42.0% 81.7%
PROTOCOL 0.0% 25.0% 1025.0%
DESTINATION SUBNET 6.3% 16.9% 1375.0%
CATEGORY 44.4% 7.7% 736.4%
Table 4.12: Percentage of NEW SYMBOLS Predicted Correctly without Track Re-
prediction
SKAION2 SKAION3 SIMULATED
DESCRIPTION 0.8% 0.6% 1.5%
PROTOCOL 0.0% 0.6% 7.1%
DESTINATION SUBNET 1.7% 1.5% 4.6%
CATEGORY 0.1% -0.2% 1.1%
Table 4.13: Change in Overall Top-3 Accuracy with NEW SYMBOL Prediction but with-
out Track Re-prediction
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4.7 Limitations and Summary of Results
This thesis proposes a method for the real-time projection of network intrusions based
on information fusion and behavioral modeling of correlated intrusion observations. The
projection of specific attack traits such as the vulnerability exploited or destination address
provides an analyst with plausible futures, enabling manual intervention or processing by
follow-on automated defensive systems.
The current projection assessment method, considering only the next step in an attack
track to determine correctness, may also require revision to account for projected futures
that occur within a reasonable time delta. Prediction accuracy rates and data characteri-
zations are also dependent on the realism of the test data sets. Although the test data is
meant to model real world networks and attacks, real world scenarios vary and one cannot
guarantee accurate representation.
60
Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
The cyber attack projection system presented here has several important contributions. The
first contribution is the implementation of the attack modeling and projection algorithms
in real-time. Complete with a graphical user interface and real-time simulation engine,
the system can produce event-driven simulation results for recorded datasets such as those
artificially generated by software, generated on a virtual network, or from intrusion logs
on a real network. The continually learning property enables the system to adapt to new
attack techniques and patterns as well as changing network architecture. The test datasets
demonstrated the functionality of the system and provided a wealth of metrics and other
information for detailed analysis. Several thresholding techniques were also developed for
selecting a number of predictions to forward to follow-on systems. Constant, dynamic
based on accumulated probability, or dynamic based on entropy algorithms were integrated
and tested.
The development of this real time projection system will compliment related work and
fill in a key piece of the overall cyber security architecture.
5.2 Future Work
This section will briefly discuss several ideas for future research.
61
5.2.1 Cross-Definition Assessment
Currently, predictions are made independently for each track and for each alphabet defini-
tion depending on what attach event characteristics one wishes to predict. It is conceivable
that prediction accuracy could be improved by considering the correlation between these
event fields.
5.2.2 Dynamic Prediction Assessment
In keeping with the theme of projecting plausible futures, a prediction could be considered
correct if it occurs within some reasonable time window in the future, not just as the next
event for a given track. The determination of this window, whether constant or dynamic,
and its relation to the usefulness of the data presented to the analyst will need to be inves-
tigated. From an analyst perspective, the discrete time interval used for simulation of an
alert event is not translatable to actual time. An attack projected to occur in the next three
track events could in reality occur within the next second, or within the hour, depending on
rate and attacker behavior.
Furthermore, the current threshold technique and prediction assessment of next event
is particularly relevant for analysis at this low level in the overall system. Considering a
window of three events into the future and using the top-3 threshold method, for example,
would mean one now has to consider 9 total predictions for any given interval. While
potentially improves accuracy statistics, the actual predictions made have not improved
and indeed the results may now obscure useful trends or correlations.
5.2.3 Supplemental Test Data
The scenarios composing each class of test data used to test this work (SKAION2, SKAION3,
SIMULATED), were based on networks respective to their class, but the scenarios build on
each other. Most scenarios introduce new attack methods and new symbols, at least in
terms of description. Approaching infinity, one might expect a much slower rate of new
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symbol introduction; the system will have observed a sufficient number of events to reach
steady state. Running the same alerts with different track numbers through this system a
second time produces higher prediction rates, as one would expect. However, no new be-
havior patterns are introduced, and patterns previously observed are reinforced, artificially
skewing future tests. A larger scenario set that at some halfway point did not introduce new
description symbols would be beneficial to test prediction accuracy after such a plateau has
been reached.
5.2.4 Fusion of Projections with Other Systems
The value of this projection system and its output is self-evident on this low level, how-
ever, it is expected that to derive maximum value from these predictions they will need to
be interpreted at a much higher level, in relationship to the network or output from other
systems. It may be desirable, for example, to combine the output of this non a priori pro-
jection system with the output of a system that does take into account network architecture
or attack templates. The challenge lies in assessing the combination compatibility of mul-
tiple types of predictions, choosing the proper combination algorithm, and interpreting the
results.
5.2.5 Automated Defensive Actions
There is an inherent danger in relying on automated defensive systems, particularly in the
cyber realm where these systems themselves could be exploited. However, with an an-
alyst in the loop there may be sets of actions that an automated system could perform
automatically or be ordered to perform that could dramatically improve response times or
effectiveness. Accurate assessment of ongoing attacks and plausible futures is a laudable
goal, but what does one do with this information to minimize detrimental impact? Firewall
rules and routing tables are a logical starting point. IDS configuration as part of information
fusion process refinement or active defense is also a possibility. On the host side, active
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directory security policy and automated system recovery actions may improve administra-
tor efficiency. Advanced defensive techniques such as denial and deception or employing
honey nets where forensic data may be collected are also possible.
5.2.6 System Visualization
Visualization is of course an important aspect of cyber security research. The ability to
inform the analyst of ongoing attacks, provide situational awareness of the network as
one would a physical battle space, and permit interaction with the data is not a trivial
undertaking.
64
Bibliography
[1] Towards a taxonomy of intrusion-detection systems. Comput. Netw., 31(9):805–822,
1999.
[2] Andre´ Arnes, Frederik Valeur, and Richard Kemmerer. Using hidden markov models
to evaluate the risk of intrusions. In Proceedings of the International Symposium of
the Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID), Hamburg, Germany, 2006.
[3] Tim Bass. Intrusion detection systems and multisensor data fusion. Communications
of the ACM, 43(4), April 2000.
[4] Ron Begleiter, Ran El-Yaniv, and Golan Yona. On prediction using variable order
markov models. Journal of Artificial Intelligence, 22:385–421, 2004.
[5] Timothy C. Bell, John G. Cleary, and Ian H. Witten. Text Compression. Prentice Hall,
1990.
[6] S. M. Bellovin. Security problems in the TCP/IP protocol suite. SIGCOMM Comput.
Commun. Rev., 19(2):32–48, 1989.
[7] Hal Berghel and Jacob Uecker. WiFi attack vectors. Communications of the ACM,
48(8):21–28, 2005.
[8] T. Bridis. Hackers used e-mail access to gov’t computers. April 2007.
[9] T. Bridis. Cia: Hackers demanding cash disrupted power. January 2008.
[10] DEFCON conference. DEFCON capture the flag (CTF) contest.
[11] KDD Cup. KDD Cup data, 1999.
[12] F. Cuppens. Managing alerts in a multi-intrusion detection environment. In Pro-
ceedings of the 17th Anual Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 22–31,
2001.
65
[13] David Dagon, Guofei Gu, Christopher P. Lee, and Wenke Lee. A taxonomy of bot-
net structures. In Proceedings of Computer Security Applications Conference, 2007.
ACSAC 2007. Twenty-Third Annual, pages 325–339, December 10-14 2007.
[14] O. Dain and R. Cunningham. Fusing a heterogeneous alert stream into scenarios. In
Proceedings of ACM Workshop on data mining for security applications, 2001.
[15] Y. Dreazen. Military networks increasingly are under attack. March 2007.
[16] J. Edwards. Convergence reshapes the networking industry. Computer (IEEE Com-
puter Society), 32(5):14–16, May 1999.
[17] Enterasys Networks, Inc. Enterasys intrusion defense host ids. 2008.
[18] Enterasys Networks, Inc. Enterasys intrusion defense network ids. 2008.
[19] G. Evron. Estonian cyber-war highlights civilian vulnerabilities. August 2007.
[20] Daniel Fava, Jared Holsopple, Shanchieh Jay Yang, and Brian Argauer. Terrain
and behavior modeling for projecting multistage cyber attacks. In Proceedings of
ISIF/IEEE International Conference on Information Fusion, July 9-12 2007.
[21] Daniel S. Fava. Characterization of cyber attacks through variable length markov
models. Master’s thesis, Rochester Insitute of Technology, 2007.
[22] ForeScout Technologies. Forescout network security platform. 2008.
[23] J. Goodall, W. Lutters, and A. Komlodi. The work of intrusion detection: rethinking
the role of security analysts. In Proceedings of the Americas Conference on Informa-
tion Systems, 2004.
[24] David L. Hall and James Llinas. An introduction to multisensor data fusion. In
Proceedings of the IEEE, volume 85, pages 6–23, January 1997.
[25] Jared Holsopple, Shanchieh Jay Yang, and Moises Sudit. TANDI: Threat assessment
for networked data and information. In Proceedings of SPIE, Defense and Security
Symposium, volume 6242, April 2006.
[26] John Hagel III and John Seely Brown. Your next IT strategy. Harvard Business
Review, 79(9):105–113, October 2001.
66
[27] Kristopher Kendall. A database of computer attacks for the evaluation of intrusion
detection systems. Master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999.
[28] S. King, Z. Mao, D. Lucchetti, and P. Chen. Enriching intrusion alerts through multi-
host causality. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Systems Security Sym-
posium, 2005.
[29] M.E. Kuhl, J. Kistner, K. Costantini, and M. Sudit. Cyber attack modeling and sim-
ulation for network security analysis. Simulation Conference, 2007 Winter, pages
1180–1188, 9-12 Dec. 2007.
[30] Zhitang Li, Jie Lei, Li Wang, and Dong Li. Assessing attack threat by the probability
of following attacks. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Networking,
Architecture, & Storage, pages 91–100, 2007.
[31] Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory. DARPA intrusion detec-
tion evaluation, 2001.
[32] J. Llinas, C. Bowman, G. Rogova, A. Steinberg, E. Waltz, and F. White. Revisions and
extensions to the JDL data fusion model ii. In Proceedings of The 7th International
Conference on Information Fusion, pages 1218–1230, June 2004.
[33] Vaibhav Mehta, Constantinos Bartzis, Haifeng Zhu, Edmund M. Clarke, and Jean-
nette Wing. Ranking attack graphs. In Proceedings of the International Symposium
on the Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID), September 20-22 2006.
[34] J. Meserve. Sources: Staged cyber attack reveals vulnerability in power grid. Septem-
ber 2007.
[35] Metasploit. Metasploit: An equal opportunity exploiter. 2008.
[36] P. Ning, Y. Cui, D. Reeves, and D. Xu. Tools and techniques for analyzing intrusion
alerts. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, pages 274–318, 2004.
[37] K. Ono, I. Kawaishi, and T. Kamon. Trend of botnet activities. In Proceedings of
41st Annual IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, pages
243–249, October 8-11 2007.
[38] Richard Price. The PDA as a threat vector. As part of the information security reading
room, SANS Institute, March 2003.
67
[39] Xinzhou Qin and Wenke Lee. Attack plan recognition and prediction using causal
networks. In Proceedings of the 20th Annual Computer Security Applications Con-
ference, pages 370–379, 2004.
[40] J. Rogers. China has penetrated key u.s. databases: Sans director. January 2008.
[41] J. Rogers. U.s. in middle of cyber war with china, russia? January 2008.
[42] John Salerno. Measuring situation assessment performance through the activities of
interest score. In Proceedings of ISIF/IEEE International Conference on Information
Fusion, July 2008.
[43] Sourcefire. Snort: an open source network intrusion prevention and detection system.
2008.
[44] Adam Stotz and Moises Sudit. INformation fusion engine for real-time decision-
making (INFERD): A perceptual system for cyber attack tracking. In Proceedings of
ISIF/IEEE International Conference on Information Fusion, July 9-12 2007.
[45] Adam Stotz and Moises Sudit. INformation Fusion Engine for Real-time Decision
making (INFERD): A perceptual system for cyber attack tracking. In Proceedings of
the International Conference on Information Fusion, 2007.
[46] Tripwire, Inc. Tripwire change auditing software. 2008.
[47] U.S. Department of Defense, Data Fusion SubPanel of the Joint Directors of Labora-
tories. Technical panel for C3. Data Fusion Lexicon, October 1991.
[48] A. Valdes and K. Skinner. Probabilistic alert correlation. In Proceedings of Recent
Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID), volume 2212, 2001.
[49] Frederik Valeur, Giovanni Vigna, Christopher Kruegel, and Richard A. Kemmerer. A
comprehensive approach to intrusion detection alert correlation. IEEE Transactions
on Dependable and Secure Computing, 01(3):146–169, 2004.
[50] C.C. Zou and R. Cunningham. Honeypot-aware advanced botnet construction and
maintenance. In Proceedings of International Conference on Dependable Systems
and Networks, pages 199–208, 2006.
68
